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inFlaTion
Price stability means that inflation is 
sufficiently low and stable so as not 
to influence the economic decisions 
of households and firms.
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he Federal Reserve Act as amended 
in 1977 directs the Federal Reserve 
to pursue monetary policy to achieve 
the goals of “maximum employment, stable 
prices and moderate long-term interest rates.”   
The Federal Reserve and all central banks 
have also long been expected to promote 
financial stability.  Specifically, central banks 
have been expected since the 19th century 
to serve as lender of last resort to the bank-
ing system by providing liquidity to prevent 
financial crises and disruptions in the pay-
ments system.
Are the goals of maximum employment, 
stable prices, moderate interest rates and 
financial stability compatible with one 
another?  Many people believe that they are 
not.  Conventional wisdom holds that if mon-
etary policy is too focused on controlling  
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Stable Prices,
Stable Economy
Keeping Inflation in Check Must Be 
No. 1 Goal of Monetary Policymakers
inflation, for example, then employment and 
output growth will likely fall below their 
potential, and financial markets will be less 
stable than they otherwise could be.
The idea of stepping on the monetary 
gas pedal to boost employment and output 
growth, or to protect against financial losses, 
may seem appealing.  Indeed, until recently, 
many economists believed that moderate 
inflation makes the economy perform better.  
However, a growing number of economists 
today believe that monetary authorities can 
best promote financial stability and eco-
nomic growth by making a firm commit-
ment to maintaining price stability.  There is 
little evidence that expansionary monetary 
policy can increase employment or economic 
growth, except perhaps for brief periods, 
and there is no evidence that inflation fosters 
financial stability.  On the contrary, history 
is full of examples of how an unstable price 
level can wreck a financial system and harm 
the economy.
Two Views about Inflation
On the subject of inflation, most econo-
mists fall into one of two camps.  One camp 
believes that moderate inflation helps promote 
full employment, economic growth and stable 
financial markets.  Inflation is seen as enabling 
labor and product markets to function more 
smoothly in the face of shocks that could oth-
erwise reduce employment or output.  Some 
in this camp believe that central banks can 
boost employment and output growth more 
or less permanently by allowing the inflation 
rate to rise.
The first camp had its heyday in the 1960s.  
At that time, the data suggested the existence 
of an exploitable tradeoff between inflation 
and unemployment—the so-called Phillips 
Curve, named after the economist A.W. Phil-
lips, who first documented that the unemploy-
ment rate and changes in wage rates moved in 
opposite directions in the United Kingdom.
The Phillips Curve made monetary policy-
making seem beguilingly simple.  Choose 
a little more inflation, and unemployment 
would fall; accept somewhat higher unem-
ployment, on the other hand, and inflation 
would be a bit lower.  Policymaking was 
viewed as simply a matter of selecting from 
among a menu of inflation and unemploy-
ment options.
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that this menu could be improved upon if 
policymakers were willing to discard their 
old-fashioned obsession with price stabil-
ity.  Allow some inflation, these economists 
argued, and the labor market would operate 
more efficiently, employment would rise 
and the economy would grow faster.
There were some notable dissents from 
this view.  Milton Friedman and Edmund 
Phelps, both of whom later were awarded 
the Nobel Prize, argued that inflation-
ary policies do not boost employment or 
economic growth in the long run.  Instead, 
attempts to use monetary policy to engi-
neer higher employment or faster growth 
result in ever higher inflation but no more 
employment or growth than was possible 
with a stable price level, they said.
Events also put a dent in the arguments 
of the first camp.  Inflation began to rise in 
the mid-1960s, and it climbed still higher 
and became more volatile in the 1970s.  
Higher inflation did not bring about higher 
employment or faster growth, however.  
On the contrary, as shown in Figure 1, the 
unemployment rate was higher on average 
during the 1970s than it had been during 
the 1950s and 1960s.  The unemployment 
rate fell in the 1980s and 1990s, albeit slowly, 
as inflation came down.
The Benefits of Price Stability
Under the weight of persuasive reasoning 
and empirical evidence, many economists 
abandoned the first camp and joined a 
growing second camp of economists, who 
believe that central banks can best promote 
high employment and economic growth, as 
well as financial stability, by focusing on the 
goal of price stability.
“Price stability” is usually interpreted 
to mean a low and stable rate of inflation 
maintained over an extended period of 
time.  In our view, the ideal rate of infla-
tion is zero, properly measured.  Biases in 
price indexes imply that, in practice, price 
stability will likely be consistent with a 
small positive rate of measured inflation, say 
0.5 to 1 percent, depending on the specific 
price index one looks at.
1  Further, price 
stability does not mean that the price index 
is constant.  Monetary policy could never 
eliminate every wiggle in the inflation rate; 
nor should policymakers try to do so.
Price stability means that inflation is suf-
ficiently low and stable so as not to influence 
the economic decisions of households and 
firms.  When inflation is low and reason-
ably stable, people do not waste resources 
attempting to protect themselves from 
inflation.  They save and invest with con-
fidence that the value of money will be 
stable over time.
In a market economy, consumers and 
firms base their consumption and invest-
ment decisions on information derived from 
prices, including asset prices and returns.  
Efficient allocation of economic resources 
depends on the clarity of signals coming 
from the price system, as well as the clarity 
of signals from governments and central 
banks about economic policy.
Uncertainty about the price level makes 
it difficult for firms and households to 
determine whether changes in individual 
prices reflect fundamental shifts in sup-
ply and demand or merely changes in the 
overall rate of inflation.  By eliminating this 
uncertainty, a monetary policy that main-
tains long-run price stability eliminates a 
potential drag on the efficient allocation of 
resources and, hence, on economic growth.
Long-run price stability contributes to 
financial stability in a similar fashion.  An 
unstable price level can lead to bad fore-
casts of real returns to investment projects 
and, hence, to unprofitable borrowing and 
lending decisions.  Unexpected bouts of 
inflation, for example, tend to encourage 
optimistic forecasts of real returns.  Errors 
in distinguishing nominal and real returns 
result in misallocation of resources and 
eventually to financial distress that would 
not occur if the price level was stable.  Busi-
ness decisions based on expectations of 
continuing inflation often turn out badly 
when inflation falls, resulting in higher 
default rates and business failures.  Outright 
deflation is particularly notorious because 
a falling price level increases the real cost of 
servicing outstanding debt.
Price stability is the most powerful tool 
the central bank has to promote economic 
growth, high employment and financial sta-
bility.  Price stability also enables monetary 
authorities to pursue secondary objectives, 
including the reduction of fluctuations in 
real economic activity and the management 
of financial and/or liquidity crises.  These 
SOURCE: Bureau of Labor Statistics 
At one time, some economists, as well as others, thought  
that a bit of inflation would be good for the economy, 
raising employment in particular.  The data show the 
opposite cause and effect, however.  The figure plots the 
civilian unemployment rate and the inflation rate, which 
is calculated as the annual percentage change in the all- 
items Consumer Price Index.
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When inflation is low and 
reasonably stable, people do not 
waste resources attempting to 
protect themselves from infla-
tion.  They save and invest with 
confidence that the value of 
money will be stable over time.
6   The Regional Economist  |  January 2008are referred to as secondary goals because  
a central bank is unlikely to succeed at 
limiting fluctuations in economic activity or 
containing financial crises unless the price 
level is stable.
Lessons from U.S. Economic History
Recent experience supports the view 
that price stability contributes to financial 
stability and economic growth.  Since the 
mid-1980s, the United States has seen a  
reduction in the volatility of both output  
growth and inflation in an environment  
that closely approximates price stability.   
As shown in Figure 2, the variability of  
both real GDP growth and inflation reached 
postwar lows during the 1990s and first six 
years of the 2000s.  Further, while there 
have been temporary financial upsets 
associated with various shocks, such as the 
Sept. 11, 2001, terrorist attacks and, more 
recently, increased defaults in the subprime 
mortgage market, these events have had 
little impact on the economy as a whole.
With inflation expectations well-anchored, 
the Fed has been able to provide liquidity in 
response to financial disruptions without 
causing uncertainty about the long-run 
goals of policy.  This confidence in the Fed 
has probably made such interventions  
more effective than they would otherwise 
have been.
Conclusion
The inflation record of the United States 
and many other countries over the past  
20 years has been far better than it was from  
the mid-1960s to the early 1980s.  The recent 
period has also had a better record of eco-
nomic growth and financial stability than the 
preceding years of high and highly variable 
inflation.  Both logic and history suggest that 
low and stable inflation has contributed to 
improved real growth and financial stability.
Low inflation and well-anchored inflation 
expectations have also likely enhanced the 
Fed’s ability to respond to the declines in 
output growth and financial upsets that have 
occurred.  The Fed responded aggressively  
to encourage economic recovery from the 
2001 recession.  The Fed’s interest rate cuts 
did not trigger widespread fears of higher 
inflation because the public had confidence 
in the Fed’s commitment to price stability.  
If expected inflation had risen, long-term 
interest rates would likely have risen and 
hampered efforts to encourage economic 
recovery.  Hence, price stability likely made 
the Fed’s easing more effective than it other-
wise would have been.
M
any countries have seen the deleterious effects of price level instability, and some have had 
far worse experiences than the united states has had.  Many lesser developed countries 
have experienced extreme inflation at one time or another, often with disastrous consequences 
for financial stability and economic growth.  Perhaps the most obvious examples of the destructive 
force of inflation are hyperinflations, such as those occurring in germany after World War i, in vari-
ous eastern european countries after World War ii and in latin america and africa more recently.  
in every case, hyperinflation was associated with collapsing financial markets and a wrecked 
economy.
2
Countries that have very high rates of inflation typically have weak institutions, including poor 
enforcement of contracts and property rights, and inefficient tax systems (and consequently 
large budget deficits).  Many countries have made efforts to improve their political and economic 
institutions, and these countries are now experiencing lower inflation and higher economic growth.   
several have made price stability the paramount objective of monetary policy and have adopted 
formal inflation targets as a way of anchoring inflation expectations.
The advantage of announcing a quantitative target for inflation, especially when coupled with  
institutional reforms, such as increased operating independence for central banks, is that it reduces 
uncertainty about the long-term inflation rate.  This, in turn, reduces inflation risk premiums in  
interest rates and promotes long-term contracting and investment.  These benefits can be especially 
important for countries that have had a history of high or unstable inflation, though presumably any 
country could benefit from announcing and sticking to a specific numeric inflation objective.
Hyperinflations Make 
the Great Inflation 
Seem like a Walk  
in the Park
SOURCES: Bureau of Economic Analysis and Bureau of Labor Statistics 
Since 1990, inflation and output growth have been 
only about half as volatile as they were during the 
preceding postwar decades.  The figure plots the 
standard deviations of real GDP growth and infla-
tion, which is calculated as the annual percentage 
change in the all-items Consumer Price Index.   
Data for the 2000s are for 2001-2006.
 
Variability of Inflation and GDP Growth
figure 2 





























STANDARD DEVIATION OF ANNUAL DATA
Zimbabwe’s inflation, the highest in the world, stood at 3,700 
percent last spring.  The rate has continued to skyrocket— 
to the point where many say it’s impossible to calculate.
3,700%
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mismanaged monetary policy resulted in  
financial instability and serious disruption 
of economic activity.  The experiences of 
the united states during the great depres-
sion of the 1930s and the great inflation of 
the 1970s provide two such examples.
The great depression is a classic illustra-
tion of how financial disruptions can wreak 
havoc on the economy.  Policy mistakes by 
the Federal reserve were critical, as Milton 
Friedman and anna schwartz demonstrat-
ed in their A Monetary History of the United 
States, 1867-1960.  The Fed’s principal error 
was in failing to act as lender of last resort 
to the banking system as banking panics 
and other financial shocks swept across 
the united states.  These shocks included 
the stock market crash in october 1929; 
banking panics in october 1930, March 
1931 and January-February 1933; and a 
massive withdrawal of gold reserves from 
u.s. banks when great Britain left the gold 
standard in september 1931.
The Federal reserve responded to the 
stock market crash by lowering its discount 
rate and pumping reserves into the bank-
ing system.  The Fed did not react aggres-
sively to subsequent crises, however.  Bank 
runs and gold outflows bled reserves from 
the banking system, which reduced the 
money stock and allowed deflation to take 
hold, as shown in Figure 3.
 deflation drove up the real cost of 
servicing debt and led to widespread busi-
ness failures and unemployment.  Falling 
incomes and increased loan defaults put 
further strain on banks and other financial 
firms.  More than 1,000 banks were forced 
to suspend operations each year between 
1930 and 1933.
The monetary hemorrhage finally ended 
when the entire banking system, including 
the Federal reserve banks, was shut down 
by government decree in March 1933.  The 
money stock and price level began to rise 
once confidence in the banking system had 
been restored.  The real interest rate fell as 
the price level rose, encouraging business 
investment and consumer spending, and 
the economy began to recover.
 
Financial markets have confronted a num-
ber of shocks in recent history, including the 
Asian financial crisis and Russian government 
bond default in 1998, the terrorist attacks of 
9/11 and, more recently, the increase in sub-
prime mortgage defaults in 2007.  Each time, 
the Fed quickly provided additional liquidity, 
and the financial disruptions were contained.  
Again, well-anchored inflation expectations 
likely made the Fed’s job easier and kept these 
shocks from having a more serious impact on 
the economy.
Under the Federal Reserve Act, the Fed 
operates with a dual mandate to encourage 
maximum employment and price stability, 
as well as to act as lender of last resort to the 
banking system.  These goals are not incom-
patible but fundamentally the same goal.  
Maintaining low and stable inflation is central 
to achieving maximum employment and the 
highest possible rate of economic growth.  
Price stability also tends to promote finan-
cial stability and enhance the central bank’s 
ability to respond to financial disruptions that 
do occur.  Maintaining price stability does 
not require that the central bank come down 
hard on every uptick in the inflation rate, but 
a disciplined response is required when the 
inflation rate threatens to rise in a sustained 
fashion or to fall into deflation.
Central bankers need to apply their best 
judgment—and they will not always be 
correct in those judgments.  But if they 
have a good record, and if the public retains 
confidence that the central bank will correct 
its mistakes, errors in judgment will not do 
lasting damage. 
William Poole is president and CEO of the Federal 
Reserve Bank of St. Louis.  David C. Wheelock 
is an economist there.  To see more of Wheelock’s 
work, go to http://research.stlouisfed.org/econ/
wheelock/index.html.  To read other speeches by 
Poole, go to www.stlouisfed.org/news/speeches.html.
   
Price Instability Knocked Economy  
Off Its Feet in 1930s, 1970s
W
hereas the recent record demonstrates the benefits of price 
stability, there is no shortage of evidence that an unstable price 
level leads to financial instability and a poorly performing economy. 
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FINANCIAL SHOCKS AND DEFLATION DURING THE GREAT DEPRESSION



































































































Stock Market Crash Banking Panic Banking Panic Gold Crisis Banking Panic
SOURCE: Friedman, Milton; and Schwartz, Anna J.  A Monetary History of the United States, 1867-1960.  Table A-1, Col. 8. Princeton, 
N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1963
The figure plots monthly data on a measure of the money stock consisting of currency and 
commercial bank deposits.  
figure 3 
Financial Shocks and Deflation during the Great Depressionendnotes
 1  These biases arise from the difficulty of cap-
turing improvements in the quality of goods 
and services, as well as substitutions among 
products that comprise consumers’ total 
purchases.  Differences in how price indexes 
are put together imply that the specific rate of 
inflation that is consistent with price stability 
will likely vary across countries and over 
time.  For the United States, zero true infla-
tion likely translates to an annual rate of  
increase in the CPI of about 1 percent and 
in the broader price index for personal con-
sumption expenditures of about 0.5 percent.
 2 See Robert Barro (1996) and Michael Bruno 
and William Easterly (1996) for cross-country 
empirical evidence on the impact of high 
inflation on economic growth.
 3 Although many economists believe that 
deflation was an important cause of the Great 
Depression, some remain unconvinced.  See 
Parker (2007) for a survey of research on the 
causes of the Great Depression.
 4 See Kane (1989).
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Inflation Is No Better
The great depression illustrated how 
deflation can wreck a financial system and 
economy.3  The great inflation, by contrast, 
showed the destructive power of inflation.  
inflation began to rise in the mid-1960s.  Politi-
cal pressure for low interest rates, combined 
with the common view among economists 
that a moderately inflationary monetary policy 
would boost economic growth and raise  
employment, gave policy an inflationary bias.
 But subsequent economic performance  
discredited the notion that higher inflation  
could produce faster employment or growth.  
if anything, the data indicated just the oppo-
site.  as inflation rose still higher and became 
more variable, the average growth rate of 
the u.s. economy slowed, and business cycle 
fluctuations became more pronounced.
inflation, and especially inflation instabil-
ity, proved disruptive for financial markets 
and firms.  Thrift institutions—mutual savings 
banks and savings and loan associations—
were particularly devastated by inflation.   
after World War ii, thrifts became the mainstay 
of housing finance in the united states.  These 
financial intermediaries borrowed short-term 
funds to make long-term loans.  as inflation 
premiums became built into market interest 
rates, short-term interest rates rose much 
more rapidly than did the return on the thrifts’ 
assets, which were heavily invested in fixed-
rate 30-year home mortgages.  evaluated at 
market prices, the capital of a large portion of 
the thrift industry was exhausted by 1980.
although the industry was kept afloat for a 
time by government-sanctioned accounting 
gimmicks, many thrifts were walking dead—
“zombies,” some called them—that had to be 
closed.
4  Because the deposit liabilities of most 
thrifts were federally insured, the collapse of the 
industry was costly for taxpayers, who ended up 
on the hook for some $150-200 billion. 
inflation declined sharply in the early 1980s, 
thanks to a change in the course of monetary 
policy.  The decline was largely unanticipated, 
however, and because few people expected 
inflation to remain contained, real interest 
rates soared as savers continued to demand 
high inflation risk premiums.
The dollar also appreciated sharply in foreign 
exchange markets.  The strong dollar was hard 
on u.s. exporters and particularly devastating 
for farmers, as the dollar prices of agricultural 
commodities fell sharply.  Many farmers had 
borrowed heavily to buy land during the 1970s, 
when commodity prices were soaring and land 
values were appreciating rapidly.  Falling com-
modity and land prices in the 1980s left many 
unable to service their debts.  a large number 
of farmers went bankrupt. 
The general principle common to these 
cases of financial distress is that significant 
changes in the inflation rate cannot be  
accurately foreseen.  Forecasting errors, and 
resulting financial losses and bankruptcies, 
are inevitable when the price level is unstable.
The 1970s were a time of economic turmoil in this country.  Inflation hit double-digit levels.  Economic growth slowed and 






















The Regional Economist  |  www.stlouisfed.org   9